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Do Market Pressures Induce Economic Efficiency:  The Case of Slovenian Manufacturing, 
1994-2001  
 
  The process of transiting from a planned economy to a market system proved much more 
difficult than expected.  As reviewed by Boeri (2000) the consensus expectation at the outset of 
transition was that many state enterprises would shut down or shrink, that many workers would 
lose their jobs,  and that unemployment would rise.  However, sectors that had been suppressed 
under central planning such as retail trade or service would expand to absorb the surplus labor 
from the declining sectors.  Competitive pressures from the emerging market system would force 
greater productive efficiency on enterprises that remained from the old system.  Furthermore, 
converting state-owned enterprises into profit maximizing firms was expected to create 
incentives to improve the efficiency of these often-underperforming sectors, either through profit 
motives or through the rigors of investor scrutiny (Brada, 1996).  Rising output from the newly 
emerging sectors and improved productive efficiency in traditional sectors were expected to 
replace the lost output from the initial transition. 
  Empirical evidence on the impacts of privatization and market competition in western 
economies had come largely from the move to deregulate in the United States and to privatize 
national monopolies in OECD countries.  As summarized in Joskow and Rose (1989), 
deregulation in the United States has led to rising labor productivity, although it may have 
slowed the pace of technology adoption.  In Europe, privatization also generally led to increases 
in labor productivity.
1  The potential for efficiency gains in formerly planned economies seemed, 
if anything, even better than in the formerly regulated or state-owned sectors of western 
economies because of the much greater departure from market pressures in the formerly planned 
economies.  
  These hopeful expectations proved overly optimistic.  The magnitude of the output shock 
from transition proved much larger than anticipated, lowering GDP on average by 25% in the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe and by 50% in the former Soviet states (Campos and 
Coricelli, 2002).  The recovery was also much slower than expected, with only 2 of 25 transition 
countries having matched their 1989 production ten years later (Campos and Coricelli, 2002).    
Some of the delay can be attributed to policies that retarded the expansion of sectors that had 
been suppressed under central planning.  Policies limited labor mobility that was needed to staff 
new jobs in nontraditional sectors (Boeri, 2000; Orazem and Vodopivec, 2000).  These policies 
included generous unemployment and pension benefits that lowered incentives for displaced 
workers to seek new employment;  lengthy prior notice and mandatory severance requirements 
that made it expensive for declining firms to shed labor; and tax and transfer policies that 
effectively taxed the expanding sectors to subsidize those in decline.  Some of the decline was 
due to delays or limits on the privatization process.  Nevertheless, part of the slow recovery was 
that the efficiency gains from market competition did not materialize as rapidly or as soon as 
economists had anticipated.  Some have argued that that increased competition could even have 
contributed to the reduction of production because it disrupted the formerly well-organized 
trading systems (Blanchard and Kremer, 1997).  An important concern for policy-makers is 
whether these efficiency gains are still to be expected or if they will never materialize. 
  The consensus answer from numerous studies that have examined how transition has 
affected measures of firm performance is that efficiency gains appear to be forthcoming from 
market pressures, although the magnitude of the effect is uncertain.  The review by Djankov and 
Murrell (2002), summarizing 23 studies of the impact of increased competition on firm 
performance, suggested that competition raised efficiency in central and eastern Europe but not  
in the former Soviet Union.  Similarly, their examination of 37 studies on the impacts of 
privatization found that it raised efficiency in Central and Eastern Europe but not in countries of 
the former Soviet Union.  Even within regions, however, there is substantial variation in the 
magnitude, and even the sign of the productivity effects, so the average masks considerable 
variation across studies.
2    
Past studies of the impact of transition on firm efficiency have generally concentrated on 
large, formerly state-owned enterprise that survived into the transition.  The focus is natural, as 
these are the types of firms that existed under socialism, but  this approach misses the 
contributions to efficiency from new market entrants and from exits.  Firm births and deaths may 
be important contributions of competition on economic efficiency.  In addition, most studies use 
a single cross section of data or else a short time frame.  Therefore, it is difficult to assess 
whether measured gains or losses of efficiency were permanent phenomena or a consequence of 
cyclical shocks that were occurring at the time.  Our premise is that by ignoring the contributions 
of market entrants and bankrupt firms on efficiency and by looking at short time frames, the 
impact of market competition on efficiency may have been understated in previous studies. 
This study contributes to the existing knowledge regarding the impact of market forces 
on firm productivity by following the production processes of all manufacturing firms in 
Slovenia that had at least one employee and that paid taxes, and not just former state enterprises.  
This allows us to measure the role of firm births in raising efficiency.  The sample includes firms 
that went bankrupt as well as those that remained in business, so the role of firm deaths on 
efficiency can be assessed.  Finally, we examine the progress of efficiency over a long time 
period from 1994 through 2001.  The eight year period is sufficiently long to determine whether  
measured efficiency gains or losses are permanent or a consequence of short-term economic 
shocks.  
Our results strongly confirm the importance of competitive pressures in raising firm total 
factor productivity.  The efficiency gains were progressive, rising each year.  They are broad 
based, occurring in almost all industries examined.  While the largest gains were in private firms, 
competitive pressures at the industry level appeared to increase total factor productivity in firms 
under state or mixed ownership as well, suggesting that is not ownership type but competition 
that spurs the greatest gains in efficiency.  Competitive pressures also contribute to efficiency 
gains by sorting out the least efficient firms, while entering firms are at least as efficient as 
surviving firms. This sorting effect is at least as large as the effect of competition on continuing 
firms in our preferred specification.  These conclusions are not sensitive to alternate 
specifications or controls for firm-specific factors.  As a result, the role of market forces in 
generating economic efficiency is strongly confirmed. 
I. Institutional background: Slovenian Transition to a Market Economy 
As part of former Yugoslavia, Slovenia’s economy was characterized by government 
rather than private ownership of assets.  Although nominally under a worker managed system, 
there was extensive political interference in firm decisions regarding investment, employment 
and wages.  To meet mandated payrolls, a massive system of discretionary taxes and transfers taxed 
away net revenue from profitable enterprises in order to subsidize failing firms that could not meet 
their payrolls.   Inefficient firms could lose money indefinitely, while efficient firms could not build 
up reserves that could allow expansion.
3   Restrictions on capital mobility also restricted efficient 
resource allocations.  Socially-owned firms were not allowed to sell their assets, nor could 
workers obtain a return on capital if they invested in the firm by accepting wage concessions.  Consequently, there was little incentive to invest in capital.  Private firms were limited to no 
more than 10 workers, and so also faced limits to growth.  
Slovenia’s transition, which began toward the end of 1988, profoundly changed the rules 
and institutions governing economic, political and social life.  Reforms gradually replaced 
worker management and government interventions with market institutions and individual 
incentives.  We briefly summarize the progress of transition and the nature and timing of these 
reforms. 
a.  Macroeconomic performance 
Slovenia led the former planned economies in per capita income before transition and has 
retained her ranking among the transition economies. After a protracted initial contraction that 
lasted through 1992, economic growth has rebounded.  GDP rose every year thereafter, 
averaging 4 percent from 1993 through 2002.  Per capita GDP fell initially, but rebounded by 
1995 and reached $11,000 in 2002.  Unlike many of the transition economies, Slovenia had 
many western trading partners before transition and maintained many of these markets afterward.  
Exports as a percentage of GDP ranged from 52 to 63 percent from 1992-2002.  At first, 
unemployment was restricted by policies that mandated 24 months prior notice for layoffs and 
pay substantial severance penalties.  By February 1991, these restrictions on layoffs were relaxed 
and unemployment rose rapidly, peaking that year at 15.4% (Boeri and Terrell, 2002).  Since 
then, it has declined slowly to 6.4% in  2002. 
b. Structural reforms  
Slovenia’s structural reforms addressed all vital segments of the economy, from price 
liberalization, the introduction of new organizational forms of enterprises, promotion of 
competition, privatization and restructuring of enterprises, reforms of the financial sector,  
liberalization of foreign trade and foreign ownership, legal ratification of property rights, and 
dismantling the system of guaranteed employment and centralized pay setting.   Slovenia’s 
reform process was slow relative to other transition economies (Svejnar, 2002).  The EBRD 
transition indexes in Figure 1 show that Slovenia’s structural reforms have progressed steadily 
but unevenly across sectors.  Liberalization of foreign trade and of prices was already well 
underway by 1991, as was privatization of small firms.  Other reforms began later and with 
slower progress.  The legal process for privatization of large state enterprises began in 1993, and 
started in earnest in 1994.  About the same time, reforms of the banking system and of other 
financial institutions began.  Slovenia has also taken a gradualist approach to labor market 
reforms, imposing many provisions to protect jobs in traditional sectors.
4  Riboud, Sanchez-
Paramo and Silva-Jauregui (2001) found that Slovenia's labor policies were the most restrictive 
of the formerly planned economies that were being targeted for accession to the European Union, 
and were more restrictive than all western European countries except for Portugal.  Taken as a 
whole, Slovenia has lagged behind the most rapid reformers among other transition countries.  Its 
pace of structural reforms was below average through 1999.  The pace of reforms accelerated 
since then, so that Slovenia’s overall EBRD transition index reached the average of other 
countries.  
c.  Policies affecting market competition 
Before transition, the system of discretionary taxes and transfers effectively insulated 
firms from competition—any business losses were covered by government transfers to prevent 
bankruptcy.  Any possible competition from private firms was suppressed by limitations on firm 
size.  After transition, numerous new avenues for competition were opened.  We provide 
additional details on the most important of these.  
Setting up new businesses. The new Law on Enterprises (first passed in 1988) was ineffective 
until amended in 1993.  It allowed the owners of the capital (shareholders) to control firm 
decisions and it freed private firms from constraints on the number of workers.  It also 
introduced new forms of enterprises, including general and limited sole-proprietorships; limited 
liability partnerships (the most common form); and joint-stock companies.  Previously existing 
organizational forms including state enterprises, cooperatives, and mixed enterprises 
(combinations of private, state, and cooperative ownership) were also retained. 
While the above law allowed for entry of new private firms, formidable administrative 
barriers to entrepreneurship have remained. These barriers slowed the reaction to the new 
opportunities.
5  Private firms are required to register, a process that takes 1-3 months despite 
recent policies to shorten the process.  In contrast, registration in western economies takes only 
few days.
6  Next, new enterprises must obtain location, construction, and business permits from 
the local government, a process that requires documentation of business plans, location, and staff 
qualifications.  If land must be acquired for the business, there are additional problems caused 
due in part to unresolved ownership disputes carrying over from the Socialist era and to 
cumbersome zoning restrictions.  Acquiring a location permit requires clearances by up to 22 
local and state authorities.  If re-zoning is required, the process can take two years or more. The 
business permit requires at least 30 documents and several months to be issued.  These barriers 
combine to slow new market entry.  Nevertheless, entry costs in Slovenia are lower and less 
complex than in all other transition economies (Estrin, 2002), and most importantly for 
competition, entry can and does occur. 
Privatization of state enterprise.  In November 1992, Slovenia adopted the Ownership 
Transformation Act. The law stipulated that the assets of state enterprise be distributed among  
shareholders with a distribution rule allocating 20 percent of the shares to the state;
7 20 percent 
to Slovenian citizens (each citizen received an allotment of free certificates that they could 
exchange for shares in former state enterprises); 20 percent to enterprise employees;  and the 
remaining 40 percent to bid.  The enterprise employees could acquire these shares at a 50% 
discount payable over four years, so there was a built in bias favoring internal ownership.  The 
process of transferring ownership from state to private hands was completed by 1995. 
Unsurprisingly, the ownership pattern which emerged immediately upon the completion 
of privatization programs of individual enterprises corresponded very well to the conditions 
imposed by the privatization law.  Based on a 1994/95 survey of 183 former state enterprises, 
Simoneti et al (2001) found that internal owners controlled 44 percent of the shares in these firms.  
Even in firms with a majority of internal owners, managers only controlled 5% of the shares so 
the shares were broadly distributed among the current and former firm workers and not the 
managers.  The state retained about 30% of the shares.   Privatization funds (essentially a mutual 
fund with a portfolio of former state owned enterprises) owned about 19 percent of the shares.  
Over time, these relatively diffuse ownership patterns became more concentrated.   By 1999, 40 
percent of initial shareholders had sold their shares, and the 5 largest owners held, on average, 62 
percent of the stock.  Managers and large outside investors increased their holdings, while small 
shareholders and the state reduced their holdings.  
Djankov and Murrell (2002) report that the only type of ownership concentration that 
negatively affected privatized firm performance in the transition economies was when workers 
own the shares.  If those results hold for Slovenia, the initial concentration of shares among 
workers would have hampered firm efficiency, but the later move toward more concentrated 
ownership among either insiders or outsiders should improve the efficiency of privatized firms.  
Foreign competition  Foreign investors purchased less than 1% of the initially offered 
shares of Slovenian privatized firms and have only made a few acquisitions since that time.  Most 
of the foreign owned firms have been from acquisition of Slovenian private firms that were never 
state owned (Rojec et al, 2001).  Foreign direct investment in Slovenia is low compared to other 
central European transition economies, due in part to the entry barriers discussed above 
magnified by restrictions on foreign land ownership.  Consequently, the most important source of 
competition from foreign firms is through imports.  Slovenia already had liberalized trade 
restrictions before the transition began, and the Custom and Tariff Acts of 1996 reduced average 
tariffs to 5.7 percent. 
Over time, the Slovenian product markets have become more competitive, whether from 
lowering barriers to entry for domestic or foreign firms, privatization, relaxation of restrictions on 
expansion, or import competition.  As shown in Figure 1, the process occurred gradually over 
time.  Our interest is in assessing whether there are coincident changes in measures of firm 
efficiency that correspond to cross-sectional or time series variation in measures of the degree of 
competition facing firms.  Our analysis begins in 1994 when newly installed firm reporting 
procedures created a consistent set of accounting rules for all incorporated firms operating in 
Slovenia, large or small; foreign or domestic; privately owned or state-owned;  new entrant or 
privatized state enterprise.  Before that time, accounting methods differed and reports were 
unreliable.   
The first year of data coincides with the installation of the first wave of privatization.  By 
1994, the easiest efficiency gains from shedding of redundant labor and from bankruptcies of the 
worst enterprises should have occurred.  The past transfer systems that subsidized inefficient 
firms were completely disabled by the end of 1993.  The firms that remained were either private  
or were state enterprises that could demonstrate potential profitability to investors.  In the 
Slovene system, both private and state enterprises were subject to competition and possibility of 
financial failure (Svejnar, 2002).  That year also represents the start of the post transition growth.  
By 1994, aggregate employment stabilized and remained steady or grew somewhat thereafter. 
Consequently, our efficiency measures are not clouded by remaining political and economic 
disruptions related to the initial break-up of former Yugoslavia and are related mainly to the 
ongoing process of institutional reforms.  
II. Methodology 
  Our strategy is to trace changes in individual firm efficiency over time, using a measure 
of total factor productivity (TFP).  To derive our TFP measure empirically, we assume that the 
technology faced by the ith firm in the jth industry in year t is assumed to be approximated by 
the translog production function 
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where the inputs  ijkt x  include measures of labor, capital and material inputs, and  ijt ε  is an error 
term.  The error term, a variant of the Solow residual,
8 is our measure of TFP. 
  The total factor productivity has three components that we will explore:  time varying 
industry-specific factors,  ; ηjt  time varying factors,  ; ψit  and time invariant firm specific 
factors, i θ .  In addition, we allow a purely random technology shock, . ξijt.
9  The formulation for 
the error term in (1) is written 
(2)  ijt i it jt ijt ξ θ ψ η ε + + + =   
  Our strategy is to specify the elements of the error components in a manner that will 
allow us to identify factors that are tied to changes in total factor productivity across firms and 
across time.  The industry-specific component is specified as 
(3)  jt jt jt γ I η ι + =  
where Ijt is a vector of industry attributes such as industry concentration or import penetration, γ  
is a parameter vector that translates industry attributes into measured TFP for firms in the 
industry, and  jt ι  is a random error.  Similarly, we can specify the time-varying firm-specific 
component as 
(4)  it it it φ δ f ψ + =  
where fit is a vector of firm attributes that change over time such as ownership structure, δ 
describes how these firm attributes affect TFP and  it φ  is a random error. 
  The time invariant firm component is specified as 
(5)  i i i υ µ F θ + =  
where Fi is a vector of observable firm attributes that do not change over time and  i υ  is 
unobserved time invariant firm productivity. 
  Equation (5) summarizes the selection issues that could bias our estimates of γ  and δ.  
Suppose that  i θ  represents a firm-specific technology component that is observable by potential 
investors.  Then changes in firm ownership status to private ownership or stock ownership from 
state ownership will be correlated with  i θ .
10 
 If  0 υi =  for all firms, then selection into firm types is based on the observables, Fi.  
Attractive candidates for inclusion in the vector Fi are ultimate ownership status measures for the 
firms.  In other words, Fi will contain dummy variables indicating whether the firm ultimately  
became privately owned, of mixed state and private ownership, a publicly held company, or 
other ownership type.  The coefficients on these measures, µ, will reveal whether firms that 
ultimately attained ownership status Fi had atypically high or low TFP prior to any changes in 
their ownership.  The related estimate of δwill reveal whether there was a change in TFP 
associated with the change in ownership status. 
 When  0 υi =  for all i, we can estimate γ, δ, and µ by inserting equations (2-5) into (1) 
and applying ordinary least squares to the resulting reduced form equation.
11  If   i υ  in (5) is not 
zero but is distributed  ), σ N(0, i  then selection into ownership states on the basis of expected 
efficiency will still be driven by the observables, Fi.  All the parameters  µ and δ γ, 1  can be 
estimated with the appropriate substitutions of equations (2-5) into (1).  However, additional 
efficiency can be obtained by applying a random effects estimator to accommodate the firm-
specific error variance, . σi  
 If  0 ) E(υi ≠  for at least some i, then selection into ownership types will be based in part 
on the unobservable  . υi   The correlation between Fi and  i υ  will yield biased coefficients on the  
δ.   and γ   With multiple years of data, we can use a fixed-effects to estimate a separate  i θ  for 
each firm.  We will no longer be able to capture the µ, but we can derive unbiased estimates of 
δ.   and γ  
  Note that under the null hypothesis that  0 ) E(υi =  and  0, υi ≠  the random effects model 
is appropriate.  In particular,  i υ  will be uncorrelated with the regressors, most notably, the fi.  A 
Hausman specification test can be used to test the validity of the random effects specification.  
Rejection would support the use of the fixed effects model and its attached assumption of  
selection into ownership type on the basis of unobservable firm efficiency (to the econometrician 
but not the investor). 
III.  Data 
The data for this study are based on the universe of manufacturing firms existing in 
Slovenia between 1994 and 2001.  The primary information on firms comes from three data 
sources.  The official financial records of the firm, submitted annually under uniform accounting 
procedures to the government of Slovenia, provide information on the firm’s capital stock, 
material inputs, and revenues from domestic and foreign sales.  The Slovenian Business Register  
includes information on the four-digit industries that describe each firm’s product line(s), the 
year the firm initiated production, and the firm’s ownership structure.  The Public Pension Fund 
data includes information on each employee in the firm including information on education level.  
These three data sets can be integrated using a common firm identification number used in all 
three series.  The variable definitions and sample means are reported in Table 1. 
  The employment information includes the number of two- or four-year college graduates, 
the number if high school graduates, and the number of primary educated workers in the firm.  
This employment information is in real terms by construction.  However, the accounting data on 
firm output and capital and material inputs are reported in nominal terms.  We convert the 
nominal data into real data, using industry input and output price deflators reported for all years 
1994-2001.  The material input price deflator is a weighted sum of sectoral prices where the 
weights are sectoral input shares generated from an input–output matrix of the Slovenian 
economy.  Output price deflators are reported for each industry.  There is a single capital price 
series that was applied to all firms.  Using these input and output price series, we generate series 
for real output, capital and material inputs for each firm and for each year.  
  The sample means reveal some preliminary stylized facts about the Slovenian transition.  
First, total factor productivity rose substantially between 1994 and 2001.  The increases in TFP 
were not due to rising output per firm—in fact average real output fell per firm.  However, all 
capital, employment and material input levels fell by a greater proportion, so firms were 
producing more with less. 
  The sample means show that there was a dramatic increase in the number and the market 
share of private firms.  The proportion of firms under foreign ownership does not change over 
time, but their market share rises.  Import penetration, measured by the proportion of industry 
sales attributable to imports, rises by 79%.  The Herfindahl index, generated at the four-digit 
industry level falls over time.  The share of industry output attributable to new entrants rises over 
time.  All of these trends suggest an increase in the competitive pressure on Slovenian 
manufacturing firms, from imports, foreign owners, more firms, more new firms, and more 
private firms that presumably will be trying to produce efficiently. Whether this rising 
competitive pressure is actually tied to increases in efficiency will be explored in the next two 
sections. 
IV.  Total factor productivity growth over time and across firms 
  To demonstrate the time trend in the growth of productive efficiency in Slovenia 
manufacturing, we first undertook an analysis of the various estimates of TFP.  We considered 
three specifications of the translog formulation (1), ordinary least squares, a fixed effects variant 
that allows for a separate constant term for each firm, and a random effects variant that assumes 
a different variance for each firm.  We report the average errors by year for the three variants in 
Table 2.  The three series are highly correlated and yield the same general inference: there has 
been a consistent increase in total factor productivity in the 1994-2001 period.  The increase in  
TFP per firm is substantial, varying from .222 to .244 log points, which implies a 25 to 28 
percent increase in total factor productivity.
12  In other words, the average manufacturing firm in 
Slovenia was producing 25% more from the same level of inputs in 2001 as in 1994.  This rate of 
TFP growth is faster than rates reported for 13 OECD manufacturing sectors over the 1980-1988 
period (Benjamin and Ferrantino, 2001).  It is also faster than the annual TFP growth rates 
reported for the overall business sectors of those 13 OECD countries over the 1981-1995 period, 
and faster than 12 of the 13 over the 1996-2000 period (Gust and Marquez, 2003).
13 
  In Table 3, we report TFP growth for different firm ownership structures.  Because there 
was little substantive difference in the time paths of TFP growth using the various estimation 
methods, we used the TFP levels based on ordinary least squares.  The first column lists the 
average TFP level across all forms to provide a frame of reference.  The second column lists 
average TFP for privately owned firms while the third column lists TFP for all other firms.  Firm 
efficiency was initially significantly lower in private firms, but TFP grew faster in private firms.  
Some of the growth was due to relatively efficient firms moving from the not private to the 
private group, but sorting cannot explain much of the rise in TFP among private firms.  The 
reason is that the initial differences were not large, so there would be little gain solely from 
sorting, and also that TFP is rising in both groups.  If sorting were the only factor, we would see 
decreases in TFP among the firms remaining in the non-private group as the more efficient state 
firms switched to the private group. 
  The t-tests of the null hypothesis that the two groups have equal mean TFP initially 
shows that the private firms had a significant disadvantage in productive efficiency.  Almost 
immediately, however, the private firms become significantly more efficient, although the 
significance disappears by 2001.  One conclusion from Table 3 is that privately owned firms  
have more rapid TFP growth.  However, a second conclusion is that TFP grows in state-owned 
enterprises as well, albeit more slowly.  Over the full period, efficiency in privately owned firms 
rose 28% while it rose 18 % in non-private firms.  
  Foreign owned firms were slightly more efficient than average in 1994.  Foreign-owned 
firms retain their TFP advantage in all years but one, although the difference is often 
insignificant.  Over the eight year period, TFP grew almost the same in foreign-owned firms as 
in the average manufacturing firm at about 25% growth. 
  Firms that entered limited liability arrangements may be private, mixed or state owned.  
They began the period with below average efficiency, but gained efficiency somewhat more 
rapidly than average.  By 2001, limited liability firms were significantly more efficient than other 
firms, having experienced a 28% gain in TFP versus 25% for firms on average. 
  Mixed ownership firms began the period with a small TFP advantage, but experienced 
slower efficiency gains.  By 2001, their TFP advantage had disappeared.  Stock-owned 
companies also started the period with a TFP advantage, but the advantage was lost by 1998.  By 
2001, stock-owned companies had significantly lower TFP levels than did the average 
manufacturing firm. 
  While private firm ownership does appear to be related to more rapid efficiency gains, 
other ownership types also experienced nontrivial TFP increases.  It appears that the gains in 
TFP are experienced broadly by many different ownership types. 
  Table 4 reports other TFP breakdowns by firm type.  Initially, large firms had a 
significant TFP advantage, but the faster TFP growth in small firms erased the gap by 1998.  
Firms that opened for business after 1992 were indistinguishable from the average firm 
throughout the period.  Interestingly, new entrants actually had a positive average TFP level for  
the period versus zero for the average firm.  The reason is that even though TFP levels for new 
entrants were similar to TFP levels for older firms, there were many more new entrants by the 
end of the period when prevailing efficiency levels were higher. Hence the weight of the effect 
of new entrants is to raise efficiency. 
  On the other hand, firms that exited business by 2001 were significantly less efficient 
than the average firm.  The disadvantage for firms destined to close was quite large with an 
average TFP gap of 17% over the eight years.  The implication is that exiting firms raised 
average TFP in Slovenian manufacturing to a comparable extent as did newly opening firms. 
  Table 5 carries the investigation of the distribution of TFP growth to the three-digit 
industry level.  The included industries represent about two-thirds of all manufacturing firms.  
Industries were chosen so that they would have a sufficient number of firms to allow us to 
estimate the production function with some degree of precision.  We estimated the Cobb-
Douglas variant of (1) to conserve on degrees of freedom. 
  The results support our view that TFP growth was wide-spread in the Slovenian 
economy.  Only in the Bakery industry did TFP levels fall, and in only three others did TFP rise 
by less than 10% (footwear, books and periodicals and printing).  In all other sectors, TFP grew 
rapidly.  
V.  Regression analysis of the factors affecting total factor productivity 
  The results of Tables 2-5 show that there are widespread increases in productive 
efficiencies in Slovenian manufacturing.  While the increases in efficiency are not of uniform 
size, the evidence that virtually all firm ownership types, firm sizes, and sectors experienced 
substantial improvement in total factor productivity as the transition progressed.  We have yet to 
identify the proximate causes for those improvements.  In Table 6, we embed equation (2) into  
the translog specification (1) in order to establish the factors that are tied to increases in total 
factor productivity. 
  To set a basis of comparison, the first specification includes only current firm attributes 
including whether the firm was a new entrant.  The results suggest that private firms and firms 
with mixed ownership are more efficient.  Firms that entered after the passage of the Amended 
Law on Enterprises in 1993 are also more efficient, although the impact is small.  Stock owned 
companies have marginally lower efficiency, and foreign owned firms have comparable 
efficiency to domestically owned firms. 
  Results in the first column do not control for selection into the various ownership 
modalities.  If, for example, only the most efficient firms are privatized, then private firms may 
be more productive because of efficiencies that predate the private ownership.  To control for 
this selection bias, we add the remaining constant firm attributes that include the ultimate 
ownership status for the firm.  The coefficients on the future status variables will capture the 
average effect of all firms that eventually become private firms.  The coefficient on the current 
firms attributes will then capture the change in efficiency associated with the move to the new 
ownership status. 
  The coefficients on future attributes suggest that firms that were targeted for foreign 
ownership were less productive than average.  Conversely, firms that came under mixed 
ownership or limited liability arrangements were less productive than average.  The impacts are 
small, suggesting that there is not a strong selection process driving the results.  However, there 
is strong evidence that firms that will ultimately go out of business have significantly lower total 
factor productivity.  The coefficient on EXIT implies that firms that are destined to exit have 
total factor productivity that is 18% below continuing firms.
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  Once the ultimate firm ownership status is controlled, the current ownership status 
variables become smaller.  Mixed ownership and private ownership are still associated with 
significant, albeit smaller productive effects, and foreign ownership also has a modest impact on 
TFP.  However, these effects may still be biased because of the correlation between firm 
attributes and attributes of the industry in which the firm resides.   
In column 3, we add measures of the extent of competitive pressure in the industry.  We 
find that the industry attributes are important in explaining variation in firm efficiency.  A higher 
Herfindahl index lowers TFP to the extent that a monopolist would be 17% less efficient than an 
otherwise equivalent perfectly competitive firm.  Firms in industries with more foreign 
ownership and with higher share of sales to private firms are also more efficient.  Firms in 
industries in which more firms are exiting are less productive.  Firms in industries in which 
entrants have greater market share are less efficient, but the effect is very small.  Finally, firms in 
domestic industries that have greater import penetration are modestly less efficient.   
  Of the future status variables, firms that ultimately exit still retain their large TFP 
disadvantage.  Firms that became private, stock-owned, or foreign-owned did not have 
significantly different TFP levels before they attained that status.  Firms that eventually became 
mixed ownership or limited liability firms did have prior TFP advantage. 
Upon attaining their new status, private firms raise TFP by 5%, stock owned companies 
lose 5%,  mixed ownership firms gain 4%, limited liability firms lose 4%, and new market 
entrants have a 2% TFP advantage.   
  The specification in column 3 presumes that selection into ownership types is based 
solely on observable attributes so that  0 υi = in equation (5).  If  0 υi ≠ , but  0 )  υ E( i = for all i, 
selection will still depend only on observables but a random-effects estimator will provide added  
efficiency.  Results from that specification are reported in column 4.  The test for nonzero 
variance of the i  υ  favored the random-effects estimator over the least squares estimate of 
column 3.  Nevertheless, the results are similar to those in column 3 with the exception that 
current firm attributes generally lose significance while firm constant attributes gain strength.   
Both columns 3 and 4 require that selection into ownership type is driven by observables.  
If instead,  0 )  υ E( i ≠ , then a fixed-effect estimator is appropriate.  Hausman tests suggested the 
fixed-effect estimator dominated the random-effects estimator, so we concentrate our discussion 
on the results in column 5.  However, the fixed-effect estimator does not allow a separate 
estimate of the effect of constant firm attributes on TFP which are of interest.  Estimates of µ in 
column 4 suggest that new entrants were 3% more efficient than firms that opened before 1993.  
Firms destined to exit were 16% less efficient than firms that survived through 2001.  Firms that 
ended the period as private firms, limited liability partnerships or under mixed ownership were 
more efficient, suggesting that selection into these ownership types were based on observable 
firm productive attributes.  However, the opposite holds for firms bought by foreign owners or 
that became privatized through the issuance of stock.  Taken as a whole, the joint significance of 
the µ in column 4 suggests nonrandom selection into ownership types.  However, the Hausman 
test suggests that unobservable (to the econometrician) productive attributes were also important, 
so we turn to the fixed-effect estimates. 
When fixed-effects are imposed, only one firm–level current measure retains 
significance.  Limited liability firms still had a TFP disadvantage, albeit only 3.5% smaller than 
other firms.  No other firm-level indicators mattered.  When we aggregate the impact of theδ, 
evaluated at the change in sample means from 1994 to 2001 reported in Table 1, we find that 
changes in current firm attributes explain none of the growth in TFP over the sample period.  
  On the other hand, all industry level measures still retain significance, although the 
magnitudes drop.  The only sign reversal is that industry concentration now has no significant 
impact on TFP.  As the fixed-effect estimation holds constant the industry structure before 1994, 
this suggests that firms in industries that have increased in concentration over the period have 
grown as rapidly as firms in industries that have become less concentrated.
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in industry concentration are also very small, so industry concentration had a negligible impact 
on TFP over the period. 
All the other estimated industry effects support the role of competition in enhancing firm 
efficiency.  Firms in industries that have higher market shares controlled by private firms, 
foreign owned firms, new entrants or import penetration had rising TFP.  Industries with high 
proportions of exiters are less efficient, and so they gained efficiency on average as their least 
efficient members dropped out.  The aggregated industry effects, γ , evaluated at the change in 
sample means over the sample period, sum to 0.085 or 35% of the change in TFP over the 
period.  These represent external benefits from market competition, independent of the impact of 
firm-specific factors.  For example, there is no evidence that a change to foreign ownership 
influences that firm’s productivity, but higher industry shares controlled by foreign owners make 
all firms in the industry more efficient. 
Because current firm status has a negligible effect on TFP, the balance of the TFP effect 
is attributable to the firm fixed-effects.  In essence, this represents a sorting effect.  Over time, 
the least efficient firms dropped out, while the most efficient firms remained.  New entrants had 
to match the efficiency of the surviving firms in order to compete.   
When we redo the exercise of assessing the aggregated impact of theδ,µ, and γ  using 
the column 4 estimates, the same story emerges.  Changes in current firm attributes explain none  
of the TFP growth.  Changes in industry attributes are responsible for 50% of the TFP growth 
with the balance explained by sorting on observable fixed firm attributes.  Therefore, our 
conclusions are robust to alternative assumptions about the error terms. 
VI.  Conclusion 
Since seceding from former Yugoslavia, Slovenia has undertaken a slow but progressive 
dismantling of its former planned economy and replaced it with more market oriented policies.  
Starting in 1994, Slovenia began privatizing many of its state enterprises and began liberalizing 
rules allowing private firms to enter and expand.  Other changes liberalized rules regulating 
financial markets, labor markets, asset markets, and foreign trade.  While the pace of these 
changes differs across markets, their aggregate effect is to progressively increase the potential for 
product market competition. 
One of the oldest propositions in economics is that competition spurs economic 
efficiency.  The introduction of competition was expected to improve the efficiency of formerly 
planned economies, moderating the adverse consequences of transition for output.  We test 
whether the process of transition led to improvements in economic efficiency as measured by 
total factor productivity in Slovenian manufacturing firms over the 1994-2001 period.  TFP 
growth in Slovenia over the period averaged 2.8% per year, a growth rate that compares 
favorably to most OECD countries.  The TFP growth is broad based across industries, across 
private and state firms, and across small and large firms. 
An analysis of the sources of TFP growth shows that in Slovenia, changes from one 
ownership type to another had virtually no impact on TFP growth.  Beyond a firm-specific, time-
invariant productivity level, firm-level variables do not alter TFP.  However, changes in industry 
attributes such as the extent of foreign competition, foreign ownership, private ownership, and the market share of new entrants and eventual exiters can explain 38% of TFP growth.  These 
gains from competitive pressures represent an important external benefit from markets. 
The 62% of TFP growth attributable to the firm fixed-effect is a sorting effect that can 
also be attributed to market competition.  Individual firm efficiency levels do not change over 
time, but the least efficient leave, while new firms enter with efficiency levels at least as high as 
surviving firms. 
Many studies have attempted to measure the impact of transition by comparing the 
performance of state enterprises against that of private firms.  For example, Frydman et al (1999) 
found that private firms generate more sales than state enterprise, but have similar unit costs.  
Anderson et al (2000) found that state enterprises had a TFP advantage over privately owned 
firms.  Djankov and Murrell’s (2002) review found that privatization had a wide range of effects 
on productivity, most positive but some negative.  In Slovenia, state firms are not protected from 
competition or risk of bankruptcy.  Our results suggest that the distinction between firm 
ownership types is not as important as whether those firms face competitive pressures.   
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Table 1:  Sample means and standard deviations for the full sample and means for 1994 and 2001 
 
        1994-2001   1994  2001 
V a r i a b l e        M e a n       S t d .   D e v .    M e a n   M e a n  
ENDOGENOUS 
tfp    total factor productivity from OLS      0.000    0.363    -0.137   0.086 
tfpfe    total factor productivity assuming fixed effects  0.000    0.406    -0.159   0.086 
tfpre    total factor productivity assuming random effects  0.023   0.367    -0.116   0.108 
lnrq     log  of  real  output      6.01      2.03     6.188  6.088 
 
INPUTS 
lnrk     log of real capital stock        4.62    2.45    4.797   4.667 
lnrm     log of real value of materials      5.46    2.08    5.746   5.433 
lnuniv     log of 2- or 4-year university educated employees  0.60    1.11       0.783   0.565 
lnhigh    log of high school educated employees    1.70    1.64       1.890   1.693  
lnprim     log of employees with < high school education  1.02    1.59       1.303   0.948 
lnmonth     log of months of operation       2.481    0.073    2.480   2.483 
 
CURRENT FIRM ATTRIBUTES 
private     firm is private in current year      0.837  0.369    0.636  0.906 
stockco     firm currently issues publicly traded stock    0.075   0.264    0.037   0.085 
ltdliab     firm is currently a limited liability firm    0.858   0.349    0.823  0.862 
mixed     firm is currently under mixed ownership    0.061   0.239    0.080   0.054 
forown     firm is currently foreign owned        0.075   0.263    0.068   0.078 
 
CONSTANT FIRM ATTRIBUTES   
ENTRY    firm’s birth year after 1993      0.254   0.435    0.074   0.324 
EXIT     firm has no employees by 2001      0.111   0.314       0.265   0.000 
PRIVATE  firm becomes private by 2001      0.884   0.321    0.788   0.916 
STOCKCO   firm issues publicly traded stock by 2001    0.108   0.311    0.154   0.094 
LTDLIAB   firm becomes a limited liability firm by 2001  0.895   0.306    0.868   0.893 
MIXED    firm under mixed ownership by 2001   0.089    0.285   0.123    0.074 
FOROWN   firm under foreign ownership by 2001    0.096   0.294    0.083   0.088 
 
FOUR-DIGIT INDUSTRY ATTRIBUTES 
HERF     Herfindahl  concentration  index    0.157    0.177   0.158    0.047 
PRIVSHR  Share of industry output sold by private firms  0.614   0.306    0.214   0.750 
FORSHR   Share of industry output sold by foreign owned firms 0.105    0.154    0.083   0.135 
ENTSHR   Share of industry output sold by new entrants  0.154   0.153    0.038   0.211 
EXITSHR  Share of industry output sold by firms that will exit  0.062   0.107       0.175   0.000 
IMPORTSHR  Share of industry sales due to imports    0.338   0.22       0.196   0.350 
 
N         28047    2904  4244  
 
Table 2:   Time Path of Alternative Estimates of Firm Total Factor Productivity in Slovenia 
Manufacturing, 1994-2001 
Year  All Firms, tfp
a  All Firms, tfpfe
b  All Firms, tfpre
c 
1994 -0.136  -0.158  -0.115 
1995 -0.115  -0.119  -0.090 
1996 -0.048  -0.046  -0.023 
1997 0.010 0.014  0.034 
1998 0.015 0.021  0.039 
1999 0.032 0.036  0.055 
2000 0.081 0.085  0.104 
2001 0.086 0.086  0.108 
     
1994-2001 0.222  0.244  0.223 
Average 0.000  0.000 0.023 
     
a tfp is total factor productivity measured as the error from OLS estimates of the translog production 
function, designated equation (1) in the paper. 
b tfpfe is total factor productivity measured as the error derived from a fixed effects estimate of the 
translog production function . 
c tfpre is total factor productivity measured as the error derived from a random effects estimate of the 
translog production function. 
 
Correlation Matrix of the alternative tfp estimates over 28,047 observations 
 tfp  tfpfe  tfpre   
tfp 1.0      
tfpfe .90 1.0    
tfpre .99 .94  1.0   
 
  
Table 3:  Time Path of Firm Total Factor Productivity, by Slovenia Manufacturing Firm Ownership Type, 1994-2001
a 
Year  All Firms, TFP  Private
b  Not Private
b Foreign-Owned
b Limited  Liability 
Firm
b 
Mixed 
Ownership
b 
Stock 
Company
b 
1994 -0.136  -0.147**  -0.119**  -0.100 -0.148**  -0.107  -0.122 
1995 -0.115  -0.116*  -0.143*  -0.115 -0.117  -0.105  -0.052** 
1996 -0.048  -0.053  -0.079  -0.016 -0.048  0.009**  -0.001** 
1997 0.010  0.015**  -0.018**  -0.005  0.010  0.021  0.044** 
1998 0.015  0.022**  -0.032**  0.027  0.015  0.011  0.015 
1999 0.032  0.036**  0.000**  0.054  0.032  0.054  0.032 
2000 0.081  0.085*  0.046*  0.094  0.084*  0.083  0.061 
2001 0.086  0.090  0.050  0.120* 0.095**  0.087  0.039** 
              
1994-2001 0.222  0.247  0.169  0.220  0.243 0.194 0.161 
Average 0.000  0.017**  -0.053**  0.026** 0.001  0.012  0.018** 
 
a Total factor productivity is measured as the error from OLS estimates of the translog production function , designated equation (1) in the paper. 
b t-tests of the null hypothesis that mean TFP are equal between the stated ownership type versus all other firms were conducted, allowing for different 
variances in the two groups. 
* indicates significant differences at the .10 confidence level. 
** indicates significance at the .05 level.  
Table 4:  Time Path of Firm Total Factor Productivity, by Slovenia Manufacturing, Firm Size, Entry Cohort, and Mortality
 a 
Year  All Firms, TFP  <100 Employees
b  100+ Employees
b Entry
b Exit
b 
1994 -0.136 -0.142**  -0.101**  -.129  -.229** 
1995 -0.115 -0.118*  -0.090* -.115  -.223** 
1996 -0.048 -0.050**  -0.025**  -.058  -.164** 
1997 0.010 0.008*  0.031* .006  -.114** 
1998 0.015 0.014 0.024  .022  -.126** 
1999 0.032 0.034 0.018  .045  -.182** 
2000 0.081 0.081 0.084  .092  -.205** 
2001 0.086 0.086 0.092  .097  0
c  
        
1994-2001 0.222  0.228  0.193  .226  .229 
Average 0.000  -0.0001 0.001  .031**  -.181** 
 
a TFP is measured as the error from OLS estimates of the translog production function (equation (1) in the paper). 
b t-tests of the null hypothesis that mean TFP are equal between the stated ownership type versus all other firms were conducted, 
allowing for different variances in the two groups. 
* indicates significant differences at the .10 confidence level. 
** indicates significance at the .05 level. 
cBy definition, TFP = 0 for firms no longer in business. 
  
 
Table 5:  Total Factor Productivity Estimates by Detailed Manufacturing Sector
a 
               
Industry SIC
b  Share
c  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001  Cumulative 
1994-2001 
Bakery    15.8  2.9%  0.055 0.008  -0.054 0.039 0.018  -0.008 0.028  -0.067 -0.122 
Woven  textiles  17.4,  17.5  1.6%  -0.105 -0.087 -0.004  0.048 -0.001 -0.009  0.04  0.042  0.147 
Clothing  18.2  8.0%  -0.125  -0.042 0.014 0.032 0.037  -0.024 0.036 0.076  0.201 
Footwear  19.2,  19.3  1.9%  0.02  -0.14  -0.03  0.007 0.02  0.023 0.02 0.03 0.01 
Lumber    20.1  2.3%  -0.07  -0.095  -0.064  -0.017 0.025 0.041 0.018 0.106  0.176 
Plywood  20.2  2.0%  -0.134 -0.075 -0.046 -0.015 -0.004  0.009  0.117  0.049  0.183 
Wooden  Crates  20.4  1.3%  -0.15  -0.103  -0.084 0.053 0.029 0.024 0.072 0.124  0.274 
Paper  Products  21.21-21.23  0.9%  -0.135  -0.167  -0.004 0.051  0.03 0.051 0.022 0.063  0.198 
Book,  Periodicals  22.11-22.13  1.4%  -0.021  -0.146 0.002 0.021 0.032 0.065 0.022 0.003  0.024 
Printing  22.21,22.22  2.6%  -0.065  -0.118  -0.031  0.06 0.053 0.093 0.025 0.003  0.068 
Rubber  25.1  0.8%  -0.097 -0.183 -0.054  0.037  0.05 -0.149  0.113  0.117  0.214 
Plastics  25.2  5.3%  -0.119  -0.179 -0.06 -0.02 0.026 0.038 0.114  0.09  0.209 
Cement  and  Stone  products  26.6,  26.7  1.2%  -0.121  -0.149  -0.096  0 0.029 0.082 0.064 0.059  0.18 
Metal  Castings  for  plumbing,  etc.  27.5  0.7%  -0.055  -0.075  0  -0.074 0.028 0.053 0.068 0.051  0.106 
Metal  Finishing  28.5  9.8%  -0.108 -0.089 -0.026 -0.077 -0.035  0.033  0.069  0.029  0.137 
Cutlery,  hand  tools  28.6  2.4%  -0.044  -0.113  -0.026  -0.052 0.006 0.072 0.086 0.073  0.117 
Manufacturing  Equipment  29.2  1.7%  -0.13 -0.149 -0.079 -0.078  -0.04 -0.042  0.092  0.152  0.282 
Power  hand  tools  29.5  2.0%  -0.117  -0.166  -0.045 0.014  -0.011 0.019 0.192 0.221  0.338 
Electrical  Machinery  31.6  3.5%  -0.221  -0.107  -0.077  -0.037 0.036 0.078 0.121 0.226  0.447 
Radio,  TV,  Communication  equip.  32  1.9%  -0.185  -0.092  -0.093 0.045 0.067 0.131 0.287 0.288  0.473 
Precision testing and control  33.2, 33.3  1.2%  -0.286  -0.15  -0.112  -0.019  0.019  0.018  0.11  0.153  0.439 
Furniture  36.1  8.3%  -0.148  -0.053  -0.019 0.028 0.011  -0.016 0.065 0.084  0.232 
 
a Total Factor Productivity measured by residuals from OLS estimation of the Cobb-Douglas form of equation (1), restricting all second order coefficients to zero. 
b Industrial classification numbers used for the Slovenian National Income and Product Accounts 
c Industry’s share of total manufacturing output in Slovenia.  These sectors represent approximately two-thirds of Slovenian manufacturing output over the period.  
Table 6:  Estimation of impacts of firm and industry variables on total factor productivity in Slovenian 
manufacturing firms, 1994-2001 
         
Current Firm Attributes, δ  OLS OLS OLS  Random  Effects  Fixed  Effects 
  private   0.159**  0.114**  0.054**  0.023*  0.012 
 (16.7) (10.7) (3.80)  (1.66)  (0.78) 
  stockco   -0.036**  -0.022  -0.047**  -0.039**  -0.021 
 (2.73) (1.26) (2.58)  (2.28)  (1.13) 
  ltdliab  -0.015  -0.038**  -0.035**  -0.045**  -0.036** 
 (1.49) (2.66) (2.46)  (2.91)  (2.07) 
  mixed   0.123**  0.065**  0.035**  0.026  0.011 
 (10.2) (3.77) (2.02)  (1.54)  (0.61) 
  forown   -0.007  0.039**  -0.015  -0.020  -0.018 
 (0.87) (2.31) (0.91)  (1.24)  (1.08) 
Constant Firm Attributes,µ          
  ENTRY  0.035**  0.028**  0.022**  0.030**  (dropped) 
 (6.81) (5.57) (4.13)  (3.07)   
  EXIT     -0.201**  -0.151**  -0.171**    (dropped) 
   (28.5) (20.4)  (14.8) 
  PRIVATE    0.013  0.017  0.104**    (dropped) 
   (0.96) (1.30)  (5.26) 
  STOCKCO    -0.005  0.014  -0.055**    (dropped) 
   (0.30) (0.89)  (2.28) 
  LTDLIAB    0.053**  0.056**  0.053**    (dropped) 
   (4.05) (4.19)  (2.51) 
  MIXED     0.036**  0.034**  0.047**    (dropped) 
   (2.63) (2.46)  (2.16) 
  FOROWN     -0.038**  -0.002  -0.034*  (dropped) 
   (2.51) (0.10)  (1.72)   
Industry Attributes, γ          
  HERF       -0.191**  -0.079**  0.005 
    (14.4)  (5.30)  (0.31) 
  PRIVSHR       0.163**  0.109**  0.061** 
    (19.3)  (12.2)  (5.95) 
  FORSHR       0.234**  0.151**  0.108** 
    (15.3)  (8.85)  (5.50) 
  ENTSHR       -0.005  0.055**  0.086** 
    (0.33)  (2.78)  (3.59) 
  EXITSHR       -0.198**  -0.138**  -0.106** 
    (9.02)  (6.59)  (4.37) 
  IMPORTSHR       -.022**  0.019  0.087** 
    (7.85)  (1.26)  (4.23) 
         
         
N  27949 27949 25726  25726  25726 
R
2  .97 .97 .97 .97  .97 
        
Note:  coefficients are taken from translog production function estimation of equation (1) augmented with the 
variables that make up equation (2).  The coefficients on the translog specification including all first and second 
order terms in the logs of real capital, materials, numbers of university, high school and primary school trained 
workers are withheld to conserve space.  Coefficients on the log of months of firm operation, dummy variables 
indicating no employees an education group, and the constant are also suppressed. 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. * indicates significance at the .10 level.  ** indicates significance at the .05 
level.  
 
_________________________________________ 
Country policies are graded on the extent to which they encourage free competition from D = 1: least liberalized to A+ = 4.3: most liberalized. The 
average grade is the simple average across all evaluated policies including legal climate and infrastructure reforms.  Labor market policies were 
not evaluated.
Figure 1:  Time Path of Slovenian Structural Reforms, 1991-2001
Source:  EBRD Transition Report, various issues
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Endnotes 
 
1 There are also a few studies that examine the role of competition in fostering efficiency in 
unregulated environments with mixed results.  For example in two studies of British firms, 
Nickell (1996) found that competition enhances efficiency while Blanchflower and Machin 
(1996) found no effect. 
 
2 Of course, much of the variation reflects differences in methodology and measures of firm 
performance.  However, even the most careful studies that control for selection problems can 
generate conflicting results.  For example, Anderson et al (2000) found that state enterprises 
were more efficient than private firms while Frydman et al (1999) found that privatization raises 
measures of firm performance.  The differences may be in the measure of firm performance 
used.  When Frydman et al use a measure of efficiency, namely unit cost, the differences 
between private and state enterprise disappear.  Their other measures (revenue growth, 
employment growth and revenue per employee) do not have an obvious connection to efficiency. 
 
3 Vodopivec (1993) discusses this system in detail. 
 
4 Boeri and Terrell (2002) provide a comparative review of labor market policies in transition 
economies. 
 
5 This discussion is based on FIAS (2000). 
 
6 The registration fees themselves are not excessive, ranging from US $500 for a limited liability 
company to $1,100 for a joint-stock company.  Consequently, the cost of these barriers is more 
in opportunity costs of time than in money. 
 
7 These shares formed the holdings of the Slovenian state pension fund and an endowment fund 
from which restitution payments were to be made. 
 
8 Note that by construction,  ijt ε  is orthogonal to the inputs, so it is productivity attached to the 
firm’s overall production, but not to specific inputs. 
 
9 We could also specify a time varying error component that is common across all firms and 
industries.  The most likely source of such common national shocks would be government tax 
and transfer policies and regulatory policies.  However, these policies were stable over the 
sample period. 
 
10 This is almost certainly true.  Simoneti et al (2001) found that insider investment was heaviest 
in firms that had higher profits in the years preceding privatization.  It is not clear if the higher 
profitability was a permanent or transitory state.  Our own results suggest the latter, in that firms 
that became stock-owned had slower TFP growth than other firms. 
  
                                                                                                                                                             
11 Note that it is more efficient to estimate the system of equations in one step than to estimate 
(1), derive estimates of  ijt ε , and then to estimate equation (2) with appropriate substitutions for 
. andθ , ψ , η i it jt  
 
12 Computed, for example, as 100*(exp(.222) – 1). 
 
13 Finland had faster TFP growth over the 1996-2000 period. 
 
14 This is computed as 100*[1 - exp(-0.201)]. 
 
15 It is possible that the causality is reversed, so that more efficient firms gain market share while 
inefficient firms drop out.  
 
16 The Herfindahl index is defined over Slovenian firms only, so a monopolist may still face 
competition from foreign trade.    
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